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ARTICLE
JOHN V. BAKER AND THE
JURISDICTION OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNS WITHOUT
TERRITORIAL REACH
DAVID M. BLURTON*
This Article examines statutory and case law defining the jurisdictional reach of Alaska Native tribal organizations. The Author
argues that the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in John v. Baker
conflicts with U.S. Supreme Court precedent and is, therefore, erroneous. Acknowledging the policy arguments in favor of an expansive interpretation of tribal jurisdiction, the Author concludes
that current federal law does not allow for such an interpretation
and suggests that the State of Alaska and Alaska Native tribal organizations seek to expand the limits of tribal jurisdiction through
congressional enactment.

I. INTRODUCTION
In John v. Baker, the Alaska Supreme Court breathed new
life into the potential sovereign powers of tribal courts not based in
2
Indian country. Baker coincides with the state’s judicial and executive branches each adopting a view of tribal governments as po3
tential resources in providing services to rural Alaska. By holding
1
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1. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
2. Tribal territory, or “Indian country,” is a prerequisite to any meaningful
exercise of tribal sovereign powers. The U.S. Congress recognizes three categories of Indian country: reservations, Indian allotments, and dependent Indian
communities. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
3. See Alaska Court System, Report of the Alaska Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Fairness and Access 113-16 (1997) [hereinafter Report on Fairness
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that tribal courts without Indian country still possess jurisdiction to
decide child custody disputes, the Alaska Supreme Court allowed
the state’s judicial and executive branches the opportunity to explore how the State can benefit from Alaska Native tribal organiza4
tions.
Unfortunately, current federal Indian law undermines the
Baker decision and may limit the ability of Alaska’s judicial and
executive branches to foster positive relationships with tribal governments. With the State of Alaska poised to encourage the exer5
cise of at least some tribal sovereign powers, a close examination
of federal law pertaining to tribal jurisdiction is necessary. This
Article begins by examining the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision
in John v. Baker in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
6
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government. The Article proceeds to discuss the issues surrounding the jurisdiction of
Indian tribal organizations, both within and outside of Indian country. It concludes that the Alaska Supreme Court’s position in
Baker is inconsistent with federal Indian law and that Alaska Native tribal organizations possess limited jurisdictional powers that
can be expanded only by congressional enactment.
II. THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN JOHN V. BAKER
In John v. Baker,7 the Alaska Supreme Court faced a question
of first impression regarding the jurisdiction of tribal courts “out8
side the confines of Indian country.” A divided Alaska Supreme
and Access] (recommending the incorporation of local resources such as tribal
courts into the formal court system); State of Alaska Administrative Order No.
186 (Sept. 29, 2000), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/admin-orders/186.html
[hereinafter Order No. 186] (recognizing the sovereignty of Alaska Native tribes,
and pledging to work with Alaska Native tribes on a “government-togovernment” basis).
4. See Carl H. Johnson, A Comity of Errors: Why John v. Baker Is Only A
Tentative First Step In The Right Direction, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 53 n.299 (2001)
(noting that the executive branch appears to support sovereignty of Alaska’s
tribes because of possible benefits to the State).
5. Report on Fairness and Access, supra note 3; see also Order No. 186, supra
note 3.
6. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
7. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
8. Id. at 743. The term “Indian country” connotes the geographical limit of
most federal Indian law. See Robert N. CLINTON et al., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW,
CASES AND MATERIALS 108-09 (3d ed. 1991). Northway Village, the tribal entity
involved in Baker, represents the typical Alaska Native village because its lands
have been subjected to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629a (1994), and have been subsequently determined not to con-
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Court concluded that such Alaska Native9 tribal courts retain the
authority to adjudicate child custody matters between tribal mem10
bers. The three-two decision by the court illustrates the difficulties presented by the existence of tribal sovereigns without territo11
rial reach. In reaching its conclusion, the majority relied upon
tenuous implications from U.S. Supreme Court decisions, a discernment of congressional intent from the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA) and post-ANCSA enactments, and four
12
compelling policy arguments.
Baker relied on U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving tribal
powers within Indian country rather than precedent recognizing
tribal sovereign powers without Indian country. The Baker majority interpreted the fact that the Court has never discussed a tribe’s
lack of sovereign powers outside of Indian country as an implied
recognition of the existence of tribal sovereign powers without In-

stitute Indian country. For a discussion of ANCSA’s land selection process, see
FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 746-48 (1982 ed.).
9. In this Article, the terms “Indian” and “Native” are used interchangeably.
The body of law recognizing the special status of indigenous people of the United
States has focused upon indigenous groups of the forty-eight contiguous states,
and assumed the title of federal Indian law. Alaska’s indigenous population is
comprised of Indians and Eskimos, hence the term Native is generally used in the
Alaska context.
10. Baker, 982 P.2d at 743. Though Ms. John and Mr. Baker were not married, they and their two children lived in the village of Mentasta until the couple
separated. Id. Ms. John is a member of the Mentasta Village, and Mr. Baker is a
member of the Northway Village. Id. After their separation, Mr. Baker filed a
petition with the Northway Tribal Court requesting sole custody of the children.
Id. The tribal court sent notice of a child custody hearing to both parties, and at
that hearing, the tribal court ordered joint custody. Id.
11. While the majority in Baker found that the lack of Indian country did not
prevent a tribal court from possessing civil adjudication jurisdiction, several Indian
law commentators believe otherwise. See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, Coyote
Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections From The Edge Of The Prairie, 31 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 439, 475-76 (1999) (examining the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent trend of
dismantling aspects of tribal sovereignty and noting how several recent decisions
have moved away from the notion that federal courts have a duty to hear tribal
government assertions of authority); Benjamin W. Thompson, The De Facto Termination of Alaska Native Sovereignty: An Anomaly In An Era Of SelfDetermination, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 443-50 (1999) (examining the application of P.L. 280, ANCSA, and the Venetie decision to Alaska, and comparing the
results with those of the de jure termination process applied to the Western Oregon Indians, and concluding that a de facto termination of Alaska Native sovereignty occurred).
12. Baker, 982 P.2d at 747-53, 759-61.
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dian country.13 Baker correctly recognized the federal Indian law
rule that Indian tribes retain their inherent tribal sovereign powers
unless divested of them by acts of Congress, treaties, or by implica14
tion as a necessary result of their dependent status. However, it
ignored the basic issue of whether inherent tribal sovereign powers
ever existed outside of Indian country and, if so, whether those
powers were divested by implication as a result of the dependent
status of Indian tribes.
The Baker majority inferred congressional intent from an absence of comment in ANCSA and post-ANCSA enactments about
15
tribal sovereign powers outside of Indian country. The majority
characterized ANCSA as demonstrating Congress’s intent to leave
16
Alaska Native sovereignty intact. However, such a characterization fails to recognize the significance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govern17
ment that ANCSA terminated the Indian country status of Native
18
lands involved in the settlement. Any credible interpretation of
ANCSA after Venetie must recognize the significant diminution of
tribal sovereign powers that accompanied the loss of Indian coun19
try. The Baker majority found it significant that Alaska Natives
20
are addressed in the Tribal List Act, the Indian Child Welfare
21
22
23
Act, and the Tribal Justice Act —all post-ANCSA enactments.

13. For example, Baker cites Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), as
indicating that the existence of reservation land is not determinative with regard
to the sovereign powers of a tribe. Baker, 982 P.2d at 752. Baker draws this inference from the fact that Montana does not articulate a test making reservation
status determinative of tribal power. Id. However, Montana focuses on limitations placed upon inherent tribal regulatory powers over non-Indians by virtue of
such powers being inconsistent with a tribe’s dependent status. 450 U.S. at 564.
Consequently, no significance can be attached to Montana’s failure to articulate
reservation lands as a determinative factor.
14. Baker, 982 P.2d at 751.
15. Id. at 753.
16. Id.
17. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
18. Id. at 523 (holding that ANCSA lands acquired by a tribe do not constitute
Indian country, thereby foreclosing any possibility that the approximately fortyfour million acres conveyed to Alaska Native ANCSA corporations may be construed as Indian country).
19. See Pommersheim, supra note 11, at 477-78 (indicating that Venetie is one
of a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that “simply ‘take’ authority from Indian tribes,” and are “devoid of empathy for what tribes and native people are
seeking to accomplish”).
20. 25 U.S.C. §§ 479a, 479a-1 (2000).
21. §§ 1901-1963.
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However, none of these acts specifically recognize the existence of
tribal sovereign powers absent Indian country. More significantly,
these three acts were adopted prior to Venetie, at a time when the
Indian country status of ANCSA lands remained unsettled. Consequently, it is inappropriate to infer from these three acts that
Congress recognized Alaska Natives as possessing sovereign powers outside of Indian country.
The Alaska Supreme Court cited four policy considerations in
support of its holding in Baker: (1) correcting the state judicial system’s inability to respond to the needs of many Alaska Natives due
to the remoteness of their villages; (2) avoiding the “barriers of culture, geography and language [which] create a judicial system that
remains foreign and inaccessible to many Native Alaskans;” (3)
“the opportunity for Native villages and the state to cooperate in
the child custody arena by sharing resources;” and (4)
“[r]ecognizing the ability and power of tribes to resolve internal
24
disputes . . . , while preserving the right of access to state courts.”
Though these policy considerations are meritorious, the existence
25
of tribal sovereign powers is a federal question, and policy arguments alone are an insufficient basis for a state court to recognize
such powers. Additionally, the same policy arguments in favor of
fostering relationships with tribal governments were present when
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Venetie, suggesting those factors
have already been weighed.
Writing for the Court in Venetie, Justice Thomas cited Judge
Fernandez’s concurrence in the Ninth Circuit’s decision and ruled
that, in enacting ANCSA, Congress intended to leave Alaska Native tribes “as sovereign entities for some purposes, but as sover-

22. §§ 3601-3631; see John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 753, 758 (Alaska 1999).
23. Baker, 982 P.2d at 753-54.
24. Id. at 760.
25. Indian law and tribal sovereignty are primarily a product of federal law
predicated upon the political relationship between tribes and the United States.
COHEN, supra note 8, at 1. The scope of a tribal court’s jurisdiction is a federal
question over which federal courts exercise jurisdiction. County of Lewis v. Allen,
163 F.3d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1998). It follows, therefore, that the U.S. Supreme
Court retains ultimate discretion regarding the extent of adjudicatory authority
retained by tribal governments that have no territory. One commentator remarked that the Court’s judicial posture on this matter threatens to eviscerate
tribal sovereign powers. Pommersheim, supra note 11, at 439-40. In light of the
Court’s jurisprudence in this area, one may confidently speculate that in the absence of territory, the Court will not recognize jurisdiction of Alaska tribal courts
over cases such as Baker.
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eigns without territorial reach.”26 From the perspective of western
democratic governments, the notion of a sovereign entity without
territorial reach is perplexing and introduces a new element of uncertainty into the already complex area of Indian law jurisdictional
27
issues. Jurisdictional limits have varied according to the type of
jurisdiction being considered (e.g., criminal, regulatory, or civil
28
adjudicatory jurisdiction), the geographical location, and the personal characteristics of the parties involved (e.g., Native, non29
Native, or Native but not a tribal member).
III. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN INDIAN COUNTRY
A. Existence of Indian Country
Several thousand allotment applications involving over
400,000 acres were pending when ANCSA repealed the Alaska
30
Post-ANCSA, the only Native reservation in
Allotment Act.
31
Alaska is the Annette Island Reserve for Metlakatla Indians.

26. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 526 (1998)
(quoting Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 101 F.3d 1286, 1303 (9th
Cir. 1996) (Fernandez, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27. Allen, 163 F.3d at 513 (“Jurisdictional disputes have been called the most
complex problems in the field of Indian law.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
28. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1976) (construing
P.L. 280 as granting specific states criminal and civil adjudication jurisdiction over
Indian country, but not regulatory jurisdiction).
29. For an in-depth analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of geographical
factors and personal characteristics in determining Indian law jurisdictional issues,
see generally Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based
Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993).
30. The determination of data with regard to the pending allotments was
complicated by legal issues, and rough estimates were the order of the day. See
DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS
109 (2d ed. 1984) (noting that over 10,000 applications were pending covering
nearly 1.5 million acres of land); see also ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE
CLAIMS 253 (1978 ed.) (indicating there were nearly 7,500 pending allotments, potentially totaling one million acres even though Congress, in enacting ANCSA,
provided for the accommodation of 400,000 acres of pending allotments).
31. The Annette Island Reserve was created by an act of Congress. 25 U.S.C.
§ 495 (2001). In the past, despite being a reservation established by Congress, the
Annette Island Reserve was not consistently recognized as Indian country. However, the reservation’s status as Indian country is no longer questioned. See
Cohen, supra note 8, at 345-46 & n.139.
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Native allotments constitute a significant portion of the Alaska
lands that could potentially qualify as Indian country. However,
two obstacles to allotment lands so qualifying may exist. For allotments to constitute Indian country, the allotments must be (1)
32
held in a “trust” or “restricted” status, and (2) identified with a
33
specific Alaska Native tribal entity. The second obstacle is highly
relevant because it appears that claims of any particular Alaska
Native allotment as Indian country will necessarily be based upon
34
the allottee belonging to a specific Alaska Native tribal entity.
From a tribal sovereign’s perspective, a potential problem is that
tribal membership is a bilateral agreement, with the individual Na35
tive needing to consent to his or her status as a tribal member.
Because an aspect of tribal sovereignty is the determination of
36
tribal membership and criteria thereof, it is conceivable that an
allottee may qualify for tribal membership with more than one
Alaska Native tribal entity. It is also conceivable that an allottee
may simply deny membership with the tribal entity and thus frustrate the tribal entity’s assertion of jurisdiction over the allottee
37
and his or her allotment.
B. State Jurisdiction
Alaska is one of six states to have been granted criminal and
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian country within its respec38
tive borders. This authority was bestowed by Congress in an act
32. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 40 (“The term ‘Indian Allotment’ has a reasonably precise meaning, referring to land owned by individual Indians and either
held in trust by the United States or subject to a statutory restriction on alienation.”).
33. The General Allotment Act authorized the executive branch of the federal
government to carve out individual Native allotments from existing tribal lands.
25 U.S.C. § 334 (2001). Consequently, allotments received in the contiguous fortyeight states generally are easily associated with a tribal entity. COHEN, supra note
8, at 40. In contrast, the Alaska Native allotments were provided from the public
lands at large in Alaska, requiring the individual Alaska Native applicants to
demonstrate use and occupancy of the allotments for a five-year period. See id. at
744-45 & n.53.
34. 25 U.S.C. § 334.
35. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 22; see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 69394 (1990) (noting the voluntary nature of tribal membership and differentiating
tribal member Indians from nonmember Indians for purposes of tribal exercise of
criminal jurisdiction).
36. COHEN, supra note 8, at 20-23.
37. Dussias, supra note 29, at 94-96 (discussing the drawbacks of membershipbased tribal sovereignty claims).
38. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953). In addition to Alaska, P.L. 280 be-
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known as “P.L. 280.” Thus, Alaska’s criminal and civil jurisdiction
applies to all territory within the State, including those areas constituting Indian country. However, Alaska’s regulatory jurisdiction in
39
Indian country is unaffected by P.L. 280, and the application of
Alaska regulatory law to circumstances arising in Indian country is
subject to traditional federal Indian law analysis.
40
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker is the proper place
for state regulatory jurisdiction analysis to begin because it is the
“most extensive analysis of jurisdictional doctrine” concerning
41
state assertions of jurisdiction in Indian country. In Bracker, the
Court held that two semi-independent barriers exist to state regula42
tory authority over a tribe’s reservation and its members. First,
state authority may be preempted by federal law when the assertion of state regulatory authority would undermine congressional
enactments and policies concerning Indians residing on reservations. Second, state authority may not unlawfully infringe upon a
43
tribe’s right to make its own laws and be ruled by them. The
Court prefers relying upon federal statutes as a source of preemp44
tion rather than tribal infringement. Federal preemption analysis
involves federal statutes dealing with the regulation of discreet
subject matters, such as commerce, criminal jurisdiction, health and
45
education, and resource management. Conduct involving only
Natives within Indian country is generally found to be inappropriate for state regulation because the “State’s regulatory interest is
likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal
46
self-government is at its strongest.” Cases involving non-Native
activities in Indian country pose more difficult questions with re-

stowed similar jurisdictional grants on Oregon, California, Nebraska, Minnesota,
and Wisconsin. The criminal jurisdictional provisions of P.L. 280 have been codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000), and the civil adjudication jurisdictional provisions
have been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000).
39. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1976) (holding that P.L. 280
jurisdictional grants do not include regulatory jurisdiction).
40. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
41. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 93
(1987).
42. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142.
43. Id.
44. WILKINSON, supra note 41, at 94 (suggesting that the Court prefers using
the federal preemption analysis because federal statutes are generally less ambiguous than the treaties and treaty substitutes providing the basis for tribal infringement analysis).
45. Id. at 93.
46. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144.
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gard to state regulatory jurisdiction.47 In such cases, the Court has
required a “particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, fed48
eral and tribal interests.”
In characterizing the two barriers to state regulatory jurisdiction in Indian country, the Court has not found tribal sovereignty,
by itself, to be a barrier to state jurisdiction. Instead, tribal sovereignty is viewed as a backdrop against which federal statutes and
49
treaties are interpreted. While Bracker does not elaborate the
precise role tribal sovereignty plays in determining whether state
regulatory jurisdiction should be preempted, several U.S. Supreme
50
Court cases, beginning with Montana v. United States, examined
the question of tribal regulatory powers over nonmembers within
51
Indian country. Montana held that tribes may retain jurisdiction
over the conduct of nonmembers within Indian country when “that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integ52
rity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”
In subsequent cases, the Court narrowly interpreted this type of
53
54
conduct. While Montana and its progeny have characterized
tribal sovereignty in the context of tribal assertion of jurisdiction
over nonmembers in Indian country, it seems logical for the Court

47. Id.
48. Id. at 145.
49. Id. at 143.
50. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
51. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (addressing tribal court civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers’ alleged tortious conduct in a tribal member’s home
situated on tribal lands); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (addressing tribal court civil jurisdiction over a nonmember involved in an auto accident
on a state-maintained public highway within a reservation).
52. 450 U.S. at 566.
53. See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (suggesting that tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers hinges upon “whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is
‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations’” (internal citations omitted)); Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (providing examples of appropriate tribal authority, including the “power [to punish tribal offenders,] to determine
tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members”); Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989) (stating that the impact must “be demonstrably serious and must imperil the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe”).
54. For the purpose of this Article, “Montana’s progeny” refers to: Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001);
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508
U.S. 679 (1993); and Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989).
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to apply this same characterization of tribal sovereignty for viewing
the two obstacles to state assertions of jurisdiction in Indian coun55
try. Indeed, the Court made such a connection in Nevada v. Hicks
when it concluded that a tribe did not have jurisdiction over a tort
56
The Court indicated that the scope of regulatory
complaint.
authority within Indian country could be determined by balancing
the interests of the tribe and the federal government on one side,
57
with the interests of the State on the other. Consequently, it appears likely that the State may extend its regulatory jurisdiction
into Indian country so long as it does not pose a serious demonstrable threat to the political integrity, economic security, or health
58
and welfare of the tribe.
C. Tribal Jurisdiction
Two federal statutes serve as the primary restraints on tribal
jurisdiction within the boundaries of Indian country—P.L. 280 and
59
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. P.L. 280 was primarily concerned with state jurisdiction in Indian country, but a 1970 amend60
ment created confusion as to whether the original act’s grant of
61
state jurisdiction precluded concurrent tribal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Indian law authority suggests that tribes have concurrent
62
criminal and civil adjudication jurisdiction under P.L. 280. The
63
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 is also pertinent. That act restricted criminal sanctions imposed by tribal courts to sentences not
55. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
56. Id. at 362, 374.
57. Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 477
U.S. 134, 156 (1980)).
58. See id.
59. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
60. Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, §§ 1-2, 84 Stat. 1358 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000)).
61. COHEN, supra note 8, at 345. Prior to this amendment, it was assumed that
tribes within P.L. 280 states retained concurrent criminal and civil jurisdiction. Id.
at 344. However, the amendment specifies that the Metlakatla Indian community
may exercise criminal jurisdiction over the Annette Islands Reserve in the same
manner as tribes exercise on reservations to which P.L. 280 has not been applied.
Id. at 345. In addition, the amendment added a reference to the several states that
have exclusive jurisdiction. Id. Consequently, there appears to be a strong argument that with regard to criminal jurisdiction, tribes in P.L. 280 states have been
shorn of that aspect of their sovereignty. See id.
62. For an explanation as to why this amendment does not preclude concurrent tribal criminal jurisdiction, see COHEN, supra note 8, at 345.
63. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 13011341 (2000)).
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exceeding one year of incarceration and fines not exceeding
64
$5,000.
1. Criminal Jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court narrowly
construes tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.
In
65
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court stated that a
tribe’s inherent sovereign powers are diminished in accordance
with its dependent relationship with the U.S. government, which
66
possesses “overriding sovereignty.” Thus, Oliphant held that a
tribe could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives,
67
even when the criminal acts occurred on the reservation. Subse68
quently, in Duro v. Reina, the Court held that tribes do not have
criminal jurisdiction over Natives who are not members of the
69
tribe. In concluding that tribes possess criminal jurisdiction only
over tribal members, the Court focused upon the lack of represen70
tation within the tribal government accorded to nonmembers.
In Duro and Oliphant, the tribes did not contend that their jurisdiction over non-Natives derived from congressional authoriza71
tion or a treaty provision. Therefore, the Court did not address
whether Congress conferred any sovereign powers on the tribes.
At the conclusion of both decisions, the Court noted that if the jurisdictional scheme represented in its decisions was insufficient to
meet the law enforcement needs of tribes, then it was for Congress,
72
not the Court, to grant tribes additional jurisdiction.
After Duro, Congress responded by statutorily specifying that
tribes possessed criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Natives

64. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000).
65. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
66. Id. at 209.
67. Id. at 211. The Court came to this conclusion after noting the federal government’s “great solicitude that its citizens be protected by the United States from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.” Id. at 210. In other words,
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives is inconsistent with the United States’
policy to protect the personal liberties of its citizens.
68. 495 U.S. 676 (1989).
69. Id. at 679.
70. Id. at 693. As part of its focus upon nonmembers not being included in the
political body of the tribe, the Court noted that tribal members, by virtue of having accepted membership in the tribe, have consented to the tribe’s jurisdiction
over them. Id. at 694. Nonmembers, whether Native or otherwise, have not consented to imposition of the tribe’s jurisdiction. Id. at 693-95. This notion of consent to jurisdiction surfaced again with a slight twist in Montana v. United States
regarding a tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction. See 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).
71. Duro, 495 U.S. at 684; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.
72. Duro, 495 U.S. at 698; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
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within Indian country.73 While the congressional response to Duro
has been characterized as an acknowledgement of the “inherent”
74
sovereign powers of Indian tribes, it is more appropriate to term
the response as a delegation of authority. Congress’ response does
not overrule the Court’s analysis of inherent tribal sovereign powers, but it is an exercise of Congress’ plenary power over tribes in
75
response to a problem recognized by the Court. Such a delega76
tion of authority appears to be constitutional.
Early in the development of federal Indian law, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over its own
members residing in Indian country as well as the tribe’s right to
77
make and enforce criminal laws. Such tribal authority has been
characterized as a component of a tribe’s retained inherent sovereign powers absent diminishment of that authority through treaties
78
or statutes. Furthermore, since Oliphant, the Court has specifically granted tribes criminal jurisdiction over members residing in
79
Indian country. Consequently, Alaska Native tribal governments
73. Dussias, supra note 29, at 36 & n.155.
74. See id. at 36-37 & n.156 (indicating that the congressional report accompanying the act demonstrates that Congress always assumed tribes had jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians).
75. Id. at 36 n.155 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-61, at 4 (1991)) (noting
that Congress was besieged with anecdotal accounts and statistics suggesting the
potential difficulties Duro created for law enforcement efforts on reservations).
76. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975) (discussing congressional delegation of its legislative authority as generally limited but sometimes
allowed, as in the context of Indian tribes). It is significant that in Mazurie, the
delegated legislative authority was applied to non-Natives. The Court specifically
addressed the issue and concluded that the non-Native, nonmember status was
immaterial since the individual was on a reservation conducting transactions with
Indians. Id. at 557-58. One point of uncertainty lies in the fact that Mazurie dealt
specifically with delegation of legislative authority, and the grant of criminal jurisdiction is arguably a delegation of executive as well as legislative authority. Considering the emphasis placed by Oliphant and Duro upon criminal sanctions posing an extreme intrusion upon the personal liberties of U.S. citizens, it would be
conceivable for the Court to find the delegation of executive authority unconstitutional.
77. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380-81 (1896) (recognizing tribal
criminal jurisdiction over members who commit crimes against another member).
78. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (recognizing the sovereign status of the Navajo Tribe and authorizing criminal punishment of a tribal
member).
79. Id. (distinguishing Oliphant on the grounds that tribal criminal jurisdiction
constituting the “power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws” over
members residing in Indian country involves only the relations among members of
a tribe).

BLURTON_FINAL.DOC

2003]

04/22/03 12:54 PM

TRIBAL JURISDICTION

13

appear to share concurrent criminal jurisdiction over Natives
(tribal members and otherwise) conducting activities in Indian
80
country within the State. This concurrent jurisdiction, however, is
81
limited to a maximum one-year incarceration and/or a $5,000 fine.
2. Civil Jurisdiction. Similar to its treatment of a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction, the Court does not distinguish between nonNatives and nonmember Indians with regard to most forms of
82
tribal civil jurisdiction. The Court has noted that the relationship
between a tribe and its members is bilateral and consensual, and
has distinguished a tribe’s jurisdiction over members from its jurisdiction over nonmember Indians and non-Indians on the basis that
nonmember Indians and non-Indians have not consented to the
83
tribe’s jurisdiction over them.
A tribal court’s civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, determined by the analysis set out by Montana and its progeny, is based
on the general principle that “the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
84
tribe.” This general principle has two exceptions: (1) tribes may
regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members; and (2) tribes may exercise
civil authority over the conduct of non-Natives within its reservation when that conduct affects “the political integrity, the economic
85
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” The Court subsequently restricted the first exception to private consensual commercial transactions occurring within Indian country between a
86
nonmember and either the tribe or its members. In explaining the
80. See WILKINSON, supra note 41, at 94.
81. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
82. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (stating the general
proposition that “inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to
the activities of nonmembers of the tribe”); Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428-30 (1989) (addressing Montana’s application to a
nonmember Indian and to a non-Indian without distinguishing between the two
on the basis of their racial differences).
83. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 655 (2001) (citing
the Court’s previous holding in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456-57 &
n.11 (1997), that “nonmembers had not consented to the Tribes’ adjudicatory
authority by availing themselves of the benefit of tribal police protection while
traveling within the reservation”); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (“The
retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal members.”).
84. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
85. Id. at 565-66.
86. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 371-72 (2001) (stating that Montana’s
first exception referred to “private individuals who voluntarily submitted them-
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second exception, the Court has narrowly interpreted Montana, indicating that the threat must be “demonstrably serious and must
imperil the political integrity, economic security, or the health and
87
88
welfare of the tribe.” Furthermore, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
the Court emphasized that Montana’s second exception delineates
a tribe’s inherent sovereign powers to include the power to punish
tribal offenders, determine tribal membership, regulate domestic
relations among members, and prescribe rules of inheritance for
89
members. The second exception does not, however, extend tribal
jurisdiction “beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self90
government or to control internal relations.” Consequently, for
the second exception to apply, the nonmember conduct likely must
imperil a tribe’s ability to punish tribal offenders, to determine
tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members,
91
or to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.
While Montana concerned tribal authority to regulate nonIndian conduct on non-Indian fee lands within a reservation, the
decision’s general rule and two exceptions have been applied to
92
tribal lands and member-owned lands within a reservation. The
ownership status (Indian or non-Indian) of the lands involved is
“only one factor to consider in determining whether regulation of
the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self93
Consequently,
government or to control internal relations.’”
within Indian country (either on Native or non-Native land), tribal
civil jurisdiction generally will not apply to nonmembers (either
94
Native or non-Native). However, tribal taxation, licensing, or
other regulatory authority may apply to nonmember activity associated with voluntary commercial transactions between nonmem95
bers and the tribe or tribal members. Additionally, tribes may
selves to tribal regulatory jurisdiction by the arrangements that they (or their employers) entered into”).
87. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430-31.
88. 520 U.S. 438 (1996).
89. Id. at 459.
90. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
91. See id.
92. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359-60 (2001) (noting that Montana relied upon Oliphant, which did not distinguish between Indian and non-Indian land
within Indian country, and further citing Montana’s statement that “Indian tribes
retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands” (citations ommitted)).
93. Id. at 360.
94. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
95. Id.
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have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers when their conduct poses
a demonstrably serious threat to tribal self-government or to internal relations, imperiling a tribe’s ability to punish tribal offenders,
determine membership, regulate domestic relations, or prescribe
96
rules of inheritance.
While the Court has assumed a very restrictive view of tribal
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers within Indian country, it has not
actively pursued a similar restrictive view regarding tribal civil jurisdiction over a tribe’s own members. In a recent decision limiting
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, the Court referred to one of
its earlier decisions that stated that “Indian tribes have lost any
‘right of governing every person within their limits except them97
selves.’” The Court’s endorsement of this statement suggests that
tribes still enjoy extensive civil jurisdiction over members (at least
within Indian country). In addressing state jurisdictional incursions
into Indian country, the Court has noted that when jurisdictional
issues involve only tribal members in Indian country, the restrictions on state jurisdiction are at least as great as those that apply to
98
the exercise of jurisdiction over nonmembers in Indian country.
Although not indicated by the Court, it is a logical implication that
a tribe’s jurisdiction over members within Indian country is at least
as great as its jurisdictional reach over nonmembers. Thus, Montana and its progeny demonstrate that tribes have regulatory jurisdiction to tax, license, and otherwise regulate commercial transac99
tions engaged in by tribal members in Indian country. It is also
evident that tribes have civil jurisdiction to regulate and adjudicate
tribal members’ conduct and rights associated with tribal member100
ship, domestic relations and inheritance within Indian country.
While Montana and its progeny are useful for understanding
the minimum civil jurisdiction accorded to tribes (i.e., over their
own members within Indian country), it must be recognized that
the Montana progeny represents the status of a tribe’s inherent
sovereign powers after divestiture of all powers deemed inconsis-

96. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (interpreting Montana’s second exception to mean that “[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”).
97. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 650 (2001) (citing Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810)).
98. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387 (1976).
99. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 372 (2001); Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
100. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 459; Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
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tent with the tribe’s dependent status.101 Such divestiture has been
characterized as restricting tribes’ powers “to determine their ex102
ternal relations” (i.e., assert their powers over nonmembers).
However, tribal relations with members within Indian country represent internal relations, and the Court has recognized tribal retention of “the power of regulating their internal and social rela103
Consequently, tribes have the authority to regulate
tions.”
members’ activities within Indian country when the activities can
be characterized as an aspect of the tribes’ internal relations. In
104
Settler v. Lameer, treaty fishing rights were characterized as a
tribal right to a resource and, therefore, the tribe’s regulation of an
individual member’s exercise of those fishing rights and access to
the resource was construed as falling under the internal relations of
105
Tribal regulation of members’ uses of accustomed
the tribe.
fishing places, allocation of fishing time, use of certain types of
gear, time of day of taking fish and fishing purposes (i.e., subsistence, commercial, or ceremonial) were held to be particularly ap106
propriate. A tribe may exercise civil jurisdiction over rights and
resources that can be established as tribal.
Settler represents a frequent means of establishing tribal rights
107
to a resource—specification of such a right in a treaty. However,
that means is not available to most Alaska Native tribal entities be108
cause the United States has never entered into a treaty with one.
The exception is the Metlakatla Indian community on the Annette
Island reserve where the statute creating the reserve can serve as a
109
source from which to identify reserved tribal rights to resources.
However, for other Alaskan tribal entities, there are no apparent
101. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-64.
102. Id. at 564.
103. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). Kagama was cited
favorably as authority by Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
104. 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
105. Id. at 237.
106. Id. at 237-38.
107. Id. at 232.
108. COHEN, supra note 8, at 739. Congress proscribed treaty-making between
the United States and tribes just four years after Alaska became a territory of the
United States. Appropriations Act, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2001). Consequently, the
ability for Alaska Native tribal entities to enter into treaties with the United States
was foreclosed before any incentives arose for tribes or the United States to enter
into a treaty.
109. The benefit of having such federal documents is illustrated by Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1916), which interpreted the act
creating the Annette Island Reserve as also reserving to the tribe an exclusive
right to fish the adjacent waters. See also 25 U.S.C. § 495 (2001).
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federal documents that can be used to easily establish tribal rights
110
With ANCSA extinguishing aboriginal title, it is
to resources.
difficult for Alaska tribal entities to establish tribal rights associated with fishing and hunting rights. Outside of the Metlakatla
community, Alaska tribal entities must rely upon Native allotments
111
to establish their Indian country assertions. Consequently, tribal
civil authority over resources may be quite limited.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES OUTSIDE INDIAN COUNTRY
A. State Jurisdiction
The general rule concerning state jurisdiction for Indians outside of Indian country is that “[a]bsent express federal law to the
contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise ap112
plicable to all citizens of the State.” However, federal laws in the
form of either statutes or treaties recognizing tribal rights extending beyond the bounds of Indian country often preempted state ju113
risdiction in specific situations outside Indian country. Additionally, the Indian Child Welfare Act, while acknowledging state
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, provides certain
114
accommodations for tribes’ interests in their children. The Indian

110. ANCSA has been characterized as a treaty substitute. See CLINTON, supra
note 8, at 1063 (referencing WILKINSON, supra note 41, at 8). However, ANCSA
does not make any reference to tribal entities, and the lands and money that it set
aside for Alaska Natives were distributed to ANCSA corporations, which were
chartered under state laws. As a result, ANCSA is not a likely source for establishing Alaska Native tribal rights to resources.
111. See supra Part III.A.
112. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
113. E.g., Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 56-59 (1962) (exempting tribal operation of fish traps from state regulation pursuant to a statute
setting aside the Annette Island Reserve and subsequent federal executive actions); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942) (exempting tribal members
from state licensing for off-reservation fishing pursuant to a tribal right established
by treaty).
114. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2001) (providing for
the transfer of child custody proceedings from state courts to tribal courts in instances where the child is domiciled outside of Indian country and the transfer is
requested by a parent of the child or the child’s tribe, § 1911(b), tribal intervention
in state child custody proceedings over Native children domiciled outside of Indian country, § 1911(c), and full faith and credit to child custody judicial proceedings of tribal courts, § 1911(d)).
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Reorganization Act115 is an example of federal law found to be a
source of express exemptions regarding state jurisdiction over
116
tribes outside of Indian country. Additionally, tribes have generally been characterized as possessing an unqualified sovereign immunity from suit (subject to federal legislation to the contrary) that
117
Conseextends to tribal activities outside of Indian country.
quently, even though tribes are subject to state law, states are precluded from enforcing such law upon tribal entities through court
118
Beyond these circumstances, few exceptions exist to
actions.
prevent the State of Alaska from exercising its civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Natives and their activities outside of Indian coun119
try.
B. Tribal Jurisdiction
Tribal jurisdiction is non-existent over nonmember conduct
outside of Indian country, but the bounds of tribal jurisdiction in
the absence of Indian country have not been clearly delineated by
120
While the Court has not spoken dithe U.S. Supreme Court.

115. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (2001).
116. E.g., Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 155-59 (reviewing tax-exemption provisions of
the Indian Reorganization Act to find that state income taxation of an offreservation tribal ski-resort was allowable, but that state “compensating use taxation” of the tribal ski-resort was proscribed by the federal statute); In re City of
Nome, 780 P.2d 363, 367 (Alaska 1989) (finding that provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act prevented the city of Nome from exercising a foreclosure procedure to collect taxes due by the Eskimo Community of Nome, a tribal entity organized under the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 473a (2001)).
Approximately seventy Alaska Native tribal entities have organized under the act.
COHEN, supra note 8, at 752.
117. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759-60 (1998).
118. Id. at 755.
119. The principle obstacles to state jurisdiction outside of Indian country are
federal activities, trust property, ICWA requirements, and specific rights retained
by treaties or treaty substitutes (federal statutes). The first two categories require
federal activity in consort with tribal entities or federal cooperation in placing
tribal property in a trust status. COHEN, supra note 8, at 349. Given the tenor of
ANCSA regarding avoidance of creating further trust property and federal superintendence of Alaska Natives, it is unlikely that those two categories will affect
Alaska to any appreciable extent.
120. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 754 (Alaska 1999) (“[F]ederal decisions
do not conclusively answer the question of what happens when a law like ANCSA
separates membership and land completely by allowing a federally recognized
tribe to redefine its relationship to state and federal governments by eliminating
the idea of Indian country.”).
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rectly to tribal jurisdiction based solely on membership,121 it has
elaborated extensively upon the nature of tribal sovereign powers
in its decisions determining tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers’
122
These discussions strongly sugconduct within Indian country.
gest that, absent a federal statute or treaty to the contrary, tribes
outside Indian country do not have criminal or civil jurisdiction
123
over members of other tribes.
Before examining the Court’s evolving characterization of inherent tribal sovereign powers, it is important to note that there
are three circumstances in which aspects of tribal sovereignty have
existed outside of Indian country. First, a tribe’s sovereign immunity from lawsuits follows the tribe as it moves outside of Indian
124
Of course, Indians venturing beyond reservation
country.
boundaries and even tribes themselves conducting business outside
of a reservation are generally subject to non-discriminatory state
125
laws otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State, but “[t]o say
substantive state laws apply to off-reservation conduct . . . is not to
126
say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit.” Thus, it is
the state’s jurisdiction, and not the tribe’s, that is applicable to the
situation and the tribe.

121. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 126 (1993)
(“[W]e need not determine whether the Tribe’s right to self-governance could operate independently of its territorial jurisdiction to preempt the State’s ability to
tax income earned from work performed for the Tribe itself when the employee
does not reside in Indian country.”).
122. The Court has repeatedly characterized inherent sovereign powers as existing over a tribe’s members and territory, or over its internal and social relations,
and then examined nonmembers’ interactions with tribes and their members
within Indian country. See generally Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
123. Montana and its progeny represent a significant paradigm shift in the
Court’s view of inherent tribal sovereign powers. Compare Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1997) (labeling Montana a “pathmarking” case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers, and indicating that Montana and
Oliphant are founded on the general principle that inherent tribal powers do not
extend to the activities of the nonmembers of the tribes) with Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980)
(“Executive Branch officials have consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have a significant interest . . . .”).
124. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-55 (1998).
125. E.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
126. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755.
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A second instance in which an aspect of tribal sovereignty has
been recognized as existing beyond the boundaries of Indian coun127
try is the tribe’s regulation of off-reservation fishing rights. While
this power indicates that sovereignty may extend beyond the
boundaries of Indian country, the tribe’s right to exercise its regulatory jurisdiction over an off-reservation activity of tribal members
128
Therefore, the
has been characterized as a grant by a treaty.
tribe’s regulatory authority over members’ off-reservation activities
is not an extension of its inherent sovereign powers; instead, it is a
right established through an agreement with the United States.
A third instance in which tribal sovereign powers extend beyond Indian country is child custody cases governed by the Indian
129
Child Welfare Act. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that tribal courts have jurisdiction over child custody cases involving Indian children whose biological parents live on the reservation, even if the children were born off-reservation, were voluntarily given up for adoption to non-Indian parents, and the
applicable state law gives state courts jurisdiction over the adoption
130
proceedings. Once again, the extension of tribal sovereign powers beyond Indian country was not based upon inherent tribal sovereign powers, but upon a federal statute.
These three instances demonstrate that tribal sovereignty is
not based on retained inherent sovereign powers. The Court has
characterized the inherent sovereign powers of Indian tribes as pertaining to a tribe’s territory and to its members, or to internal rela131
In John v. Baker, however, the Alaska Supreme Court
tions.
concluded that Alaska Native tribal entities do have sovereign
powers outside Indian country to adjudicate custody disputes. The
Baker court noted that “[t]he federal decisions contain language
supporting the existence of tribal sovereignty based on either land
132
or tribal status.” Baker used U.S. Supreme Court decisions associating the application of inherent sovereign powers with territory
“and” members, and converted the association to one of inherent
sovereign powers with territory “or” members. Yet, this disasso-

127. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 238 (9th Cir. 1974).
128. Id. After reviewing a treaty between the tribe and the United States, the
court concluded that “the Yakima Nation did reserve the authority to regulate
Tribal fishing at ‘all usual and accustomed places,’ whether on or off the reservation.” Id. at 237.
129. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2000).
130. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 51-54 (1989).
131. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
132. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 759 (Alaska 1999).
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ciation of territory from members is not correctly based on U.S.
133
Supreme Court decisions.
Separating the territorial and membership aspects of inherent
tribal sovereign powers is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and creates confusion. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme
134
Court’s own decisions appear inconsistent. In an attempt to unify
the Court’s sovereignty decisions under an “internal relationships”
analysis, one commentator noted that the Court appeared to switch
from identifying tribal internal relationships on a geographical ba135
However, by
sis to identifying them on a membership basis.
viewing territoriality and membership as inseparable requirements
for the exercise of inherent tribal sovereign powers and by focusing
on the paradigm shift represented by Montana, the Court’s tribal
sovereignty decisions can be reconciled.
The connection between territoriality and membership is not a
new construct. The idea that tribes possess “attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territories” can be traced
136
back to Worcester v. Georgia. When Worcester was decided, the
concept of reservations as they exist today and the legal concept of
137
Indian country did not exist. Tribal territories were homogeneous in nature, with whites being generally excluded from tribal ter138
Thus, Worcester’s proclamation regarding tribal soverritories.
eign powers extending over a tribe’s territory and its members
provided an adequate means to determine jurisdictional issues. Is133. See id. at 758 (implying from the Supreme Court’s refusal to decide the
issue in either case that a tribe’s inherent sovereign powers exist independently of
Indian country).
134. See Dussias, supra note 29, at 17-18 (alleging that the Court has based
tribal jurisdiction strictly on membership, tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction strictly
on geography, and tribal regulatory jurisdiction on a combination of membership
and geography).
135. See id. at 24-25 (discussing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), a
commentator noted that the Court discussed internal relations using membership
analysis rather than the geographical analysis that had been employed previously).
136. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
137. The policy of confining Indians to reservations within states began in the
early 1850s as western expansion of the United States prevented placing tribes in
U.S. territories outside of states. See CLINTON, supra note 8, at 146-47. The legal
concept of Indian country evolved through a series of Supreme Court decisions
adopted by Congress in 1948 at 18 U.S.C. section 1151 (2000). See COHEN, supra
note 8, at 27-41.
138. Worcester was decided at the end of what has been characterized as the
“Trade and Intercourse Act Era” of federal Indian law. During this period, various trade and intercourse acts were enacted, restricting whites, inter alia, for most
purposes, from tribal territories. See CLINTON, supra note 8, at 142-43.
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sues of tribal jurisdiction over non-Natives within tribal territory
did not exist, nor did tribal members generally reside outside of
tribal territory.
The homogeneous nature of tribal territory began to erode in
the late 1800s with the dividing of reservations into allotments for
individual Indians and the opening of reservations to homestead139
140
ers. In the 1960s, a “turbulent revitalization of tribal entities”
occurred as tribes became the basic governmental unit of Indian
policy and were encouraged to exercise their inherent sovereign
141
By the late 1970s, the Court was faced with tribes atpowers.
tempting to exercise inherent sovereign powers over their territories comprised of reservations with checkerboard ownership pat142
terns, and over tribal members’ interactions with nonmembers. It
is in this context that Montana and its progeny must be viewed.
The Worcester paradigm provided inadequate guidance for determining the reach of inherent tribal powers in a modern society
representing a complex mix of cultures. Consequently, Montana
announced a new paradigm to determine the extent of inherent
tribal sovereign powers by stating that “exercise of tribal power
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status
143
of the tribes.” While Montana did not expressly announce that it
was changing the paradigm, this change is evidenced by the Court’s
144
subsequent referral to Montana as a “pathmarking” decision and
its application of this paradigm in its subsequent decisions concerning inherent tribal sovereign powers.
This new paradigm was intended to accommodate modern Indian circumstances and tribal interactions with nonmembers as
demonstrated by Montana’s discussion of the effects of the Allot145
ment Act upon the reservation and the State’s activities, with re-

139. This era resulted in the development of the modern checkerboard ownership pattern with many non-Natives holding fee title to lands within the external
boundaries of reservations. See id. at 147-52.
140. Id. at 159.
141. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 180.
142. CLINTON, supra note 8, at 159-60.
143. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
144. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
145. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 548 (describing the allotment process for the
tribe’s reservation and noting that twenty-eight percent of the reservation is held
in fee simple by non-Indian owners).
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gard to the resources the tribe was attempting to regulate.146 Furthermore, the Montana progeny establishes that the new paradigm
should not be limited to the narrow circumstances addressed by
147
Montana. Thus, the new paradigm has been applied to the following: (1) questions concerning tribal regulation of nonmember
148
activity on non-Indian lands within Indian country; (2) tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over incidents occurring on tribal lands,
subject to a state highway right-of-way, and involving nonmember
149
litigants; and (3) tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over the conduct
150
of state officials on tribal lands. After announcing the Montana
paradigm, the Court then announced a more specific paradigm for
determining the application of inherent tribal sovereign powers to
151
nonmembers.
Rather than a wholesale abandonment of Worcester’s paradigm, Montana’s new paradigm involves a more complex analysis
152
of the territorial and membership aspects of the old paradigm. It
emphasizes the unification of the territorial and membership aspects, and requires the consideration of both aspects when deter153
mining the extent of inherent tribal sovereign powers. In Atkin-

146. See id. at 548-49 (discussing Montana’s enhancement of fish and game resources on the reservation, regulation of fishing and hunting on the reservation,
and the tribe’s past accommodation of the State’s regulation of on-reservation
fishing and hunting).
147. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (“While Montana immediately involved regulatory authority, the Court broadly addressed the concept of ‘inherent sovereignty.’” (citations omitted)); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 650
(2001) (noting that with regard to retained or inherent sovereignty, Montana is the
most exhaustively reasoned modern Supreme Court case addressing such powers).
148. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
149. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456.
150. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359-60 (2001).
151. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-66.
152. While the new paradigm does not refer specifically to a tribe’s authority
over its territory or over its members, it is evident from the Court’s application of
this paradigm that territorial and membership aspects of sovereignty have been
incorporated. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359-60 (“The ownership status of land . . . is
only one factor to consider . . . . Hitherto, the absence of tribal ownership has been
virtually conclusive of the absence of tribal civil jurisdiction.”); Strate, 520 U.S. at
457-58 (considering the effects of nonmembers’ careless driving on a public highway running through a reservation upon the safety of tribal members, and applying Montana’s rules to determine the extent of the tribe’s civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over allegedly tortious conduct occurring within a reservation).
153. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (“[T]he existence of tribal ownership is not
alone enough to support regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers.”); Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 650 (2001) (“This delineation of members
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son Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley,154 the Court stated that an “Indian
tribe’s inherent power to tax only extended to transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its mem155
bers.” Atkinson provided additional clarification by resurrecting
Worcester’s paradigm, but expressing it as a limitation on inherent
156
Both conditions—territory and memtribal sovereign powers.
bership—must be satisfied for application of inherent tribal sovereign powers to be appropriate.
Since Montana’s new paradigm is applicable to inherent tribal
sovereignty analysis in general, and requires that both territorial
and membership aspects of tribal sovereignty be examined, the assertion of tribal jurisdiction in the absence of Indian country is inappropriate. This conclusion is supported by Atkinson’s apparent
disdain for the lower court’s statement that an Indian tribe’s “jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or
157
limited by the title to the land which they occupy in it.” In com158
parison, Solem v. Bartlett addressed state, federal, and tribal
159
The Court
criminal jurisdiction with regard to “surplus lands.”
noted that if the lands had not retained their reservation status,
then jurisdiction resided in the State; but if the lands retained their
reservation status, then the state, federal, and tribal authorities
160
shared jurisdiction over the lands. Thus, tribal criminal jurisdiction ends at the reservation boundary and there is no reason to believe that inherent tribal sovereign civil authority is any different.
Further support for the notion that a tribe’s civil jurisdiction
ends at the boundaries of Indian country can be drawn from the
Court’s comments with regard to the interplay of state and tribal
and nonmembers, tribal land and non-Indian fee land, stemmed from the dependent nature of tribal sovereignty.”).
154. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
155. Id. at 653 (internal quotations omitted).
156. Id. at 649-50 (viewing the Worcester paradigm for determining the extent
of inherent tribal sovereign powers as setting limits consistent with the modern
Indian law concept that inherent tribal sovereign powers are those which the tribe
has not relinquished). When viewed in this manner, it is apparent that tribes have
relinquished sovereignty over matters occurring outside their territories and over
matters not affecting their members.
157. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653 & n.4 (referring to Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947,
951 (1905)).
158. 465 U.S. 463, 463 (1984).
159. Id. “Surplus lands” refers to lands that were opened to non-Indian homesteaders after reservation lands had been allotted to tribal members.
160. Id. at 467. If the lands retained a reservation status, a shared jurisdictional
situation existed because jurisdiction depended upon individual ownership of each
plot of land and whether the offender was Native or non-Native.
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jurisdiction. First, it is significant that state jurisdictional intrusions
into Indian country are based upon reservations or other forms of
161
Consequently,
Indian country being part of a state’s territory.
when a State is exercising its jurisdiction within Indian country it is
not exercising its jurisdiction outside of its own territorial limits.
Second, while the Court has often restricted state jurisdictional intrusions into Indian country on the basis that it would inappropri162
ately infringe upon tribal jurisdiction, the Court has also recognized that tribal jurisdiction must avoid undue interference with a
163
state’s jurisdiction. As a result, the extension of tribal jurisdiction
beyond the boundaries of Indian country both interferes with state
operations and is inconsistent with the Court’s characterization of
state jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
With Venetie’s elimination of ANCSA lands as a source of Indian country, opportunities for Alaska Native tribal entities to exercise criminal, civil adjudicatory, or regulatory jurisdiction are
minimal. On the one remaining reservation in Alaska, the Annette
Island Reserve, the Metlakatla Indian Community may exercise
criminal, civil adjudicatory, and regulatory jurisdiction. The tribe’s
criminal jurisdiction is applicable only to Natives (member or
nonmember), and its criminal sanctions are limited to one year of
incarceration and monetary fines of no more than $5,000. The
Metlakatla Indian Community should be able to freely exercise its
civil adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction over its members’ activities on the reservation. However, its civil adjudicatory and
regulatory powers over nonmembers, including Native nonmembers, are constrained by Montana’s holding that tribes have neither
civil adjudicatory nor regulatory authority over nonmembers except when nonmembers enter into consensual commercial relationships with the tribe or its members, or when the conduct sought to
be regulated threatens the political integrity, economic security, or
164
health or welfare of the tribe. The ability of the tribe to exercise
regulatory authority such as zoning regulations over lands owned
161. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001) (“an Indian reservation is
considered part of the territory of the State”).
162. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
163. Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989)
(addressing the proper application of Montana’s second exception to the general
rule that tribal jurisdiction does not extend to nonmembers, and noting that it
strikes a proper balance between protecting tribal governments and avoiding undue interference with state sovereignty).
164. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
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by nonmembers will likely depend on the ownership pattern within
165
the reserve. The ability to exercise such authority over nonmembers’ land will also depend upon the nature of the tribe’s zoning
plans and the degree to which nonmembers’ land use may threaten
166
the tribe’s overall scheme. Because of P.L. 280, Alaska has concurrent criminal and civil adjudication jurisdiction over the
Annette Island Reserve. However, the State’s regulatory jurisdiction will be limited in that it must not pose a serious demonstrable
threat to the political integrity, economic security, or health and
welfare of the tribe.
While it is unclear as to the exact number of Native allotments
and the amount of associated acreage that potentially may constitute Indian country, the number and acreage are of significant proportions. On such lands, the tribal and state jurisdictional schemes
will be similar to those specified for the Annette Island Reserve,
with the caveat that tribal criminal jurisdiction on such lands may
be subject to the State where it has exclusive criminal jurisdiction.
The primary obstacle to the use of Native allotments as a source of
Indian country for the purposes of tribal jurisdiction will be establishing the association of Native allotment owners with specific
tribal entities. It will be critical for Alaska Native tribal entities to
develop official tribal roles and provide benefits and/or services to
tribal members so that Native allotment owners will consent to
membership in the tribal entities.
Outside of the Annette Island Reserve and the Native allotments qualifying as Indian country, there appear to be no other
possible enclaves of Indian country in the State of Alaska. Outside
Indian country, the State’s sovereign powers will be unaffected by
notions of Indian law, with the possible exception of tribal compliance with state laws. Although the Alaska Supreme Court suggests
otherwise in Baker, the most recent U.S. Supreme Court cases are
highly indicative of the proposition that tribes, without Indian
country, do not have inherent sovereign powers and lack criminal,
civil adjudicatory, and regulatory authority.
In Baker, the Alaska Supreme Court made several cogent
policy arguments for recognizing tribal court jurisdiction in
167
Alaska. However, if federal Indian law dictates that tribes do not
have inherent sovereign powers that exist outside Indian country,
165. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 436-37.
166. Id. at 441-43.
167. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 760-61 (Alaska 1999) (noting that recognition
of tribal court jurisdiction in Alaska would not only serve federal Indian policy
concerns, but would also provide a badly needed judicial forum for rural Alaska
Native villages).
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then tribal jurisdiction cannot exist without Indian country. The
solution lies in congressional action, such as that which occurred
after Duro. Alaska Native tribal entities should join with the
Alaska State Judiciary and the Alaska Governor’s Office (both of
168
which have indicated support for tribal courts) to orchestrate a
lobbying campaign designed to encourage Congress to pass legislation delineating tribal sovereign powers for Alaska Native tribal
entities that are not based in Indian country.

168. Report on Fairness and Access, supra note 3; see also Order No. 186, supra
note 3.

